Many certificateless schemes have been proposed for different purposes, but as for as their applications in any electronic cash schemes there is still a lot of potential for strengthening the security aspect, and this paper is an attempt towards this. In this paper we propose a new type certificateless scheme which is applied for group oriented signcryption rather than a signature without using bilinear pairing, then a new E-cash system has been presented based on the proposed scheme. The salient feature of the proposed scheme is that any signcrypter of a group can signcrypt a document with the group manager and send it to the verifier. The verifier verifies the authenticity of the signcrypted text by using the group's public parameters and cannot link a signcrypted text to the corresponding signcrypter. However, even the group manager or any signcrypter of that group alone cannot produce a valid signcrypted text. In case of any legal dispute, such as no repudiation of the signature, the group manager has the ability to reveal the identity of the signcrypter. The proposed scheme is secure against the indistinguishably chosen cipher text attack (IND-CCA). Unlinkability, unforgeability and traceability and its security are based on the two computationally hard problems, the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) and Discrete Logarithmic Problem (DLP). The new scheme's security analysis clearly suggests that it is very reliable to be used in security vulnerable applications in real life.
Introduction
Due to the properties of integrity and authentication, digital signatures play an important role in our modern electronic society. The integrity property ensures that the received messages are not modified, and the authentication property ensures that the sender is not impersonated [1] . Because of its importance, many variations of the digital signature scheme were proposed, such as blind signature, group signature, undeniable signature etc., which can be used in different application situations. A group signature was introduced by Chaum and Van Heyst [2] . It allows any member of a group to anonymously sign a document on behalf of the group. A user can verify a signature with the group's public key that is usually constant and unique for the whole group. However, he/she cannot know which individual of the group signs the document [1] . More formally, a group signature scheme has the following bottlenecks: (i) only members of the group can sign for messages; (ii) the receiver of the signature can verify that it is a valid signature of that group, but cannot discover which member of the group made it; (iii) in case of a dispute later on, the signature can be ''opened'' to reveal the identity of the signer by the group manager. Later, several group signature schemes have been proposed. Shamir proposed the idea of identitybased cryptography in 1984 [2] . The ID-based public key system is considered a good alternative for a certificate-based public key setting, especially when efficient key management and moderate security are required. In general, ID-based cryptography has the advantage of easier key distribution as compared to conventional public key cryptography [3, 4] . In 1997, Park et al. presented an ID-based group signature which is based on OhtaOkamoto's ID-based signature scheme. Here, the group signature is verified from the identities of the group members. However, their scheme has a serious problem in which all of the previous group signatures signed by other members will be invalid if the group is changed. In addition, the length of a group signature is dependent upon the number of group members [5] . Then in 1998, Yuh-Min Tseng and Jinn-Ke Jan proposed a more efficient ID based group signature scheme which solves the problem of the invalidation of previous group signatures caused by the inclusion of a new group member or the exclusion of an old group member. In addition, the group signature is contained to a fixed length [5] . But the main drawback of ID based cryptosystem in key escrow problem. In order to solve this key escrow problem in ID based cryptography, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a new type of encryption scheme that avoids the drawbacks of both traditional public-key encryption and identity-based encryption [1] . They termed this new type of encryption certificateless public-key encryption(CL-PKE) because their encryption scheme did not require a public key infrastructure. In other words it is a organic combination of the functionality of a public key scheme with that of an identity based scheme [6] . Then in 2005, Chunbo Ma, Faliang Ao and Dake He introduced the concept of a certificateless group signature, which solves the problem of key escrow in ID based group signature schemes. In 1997, Zheng proposed a new cryptographic primitive: signcryption, which can perform digital signature and public key encryption in a single logic step, at lower computational costs and communication overheads than the above sign-then-encrypt way [2] . Then Kwak-Moon proposed a group signcryption scheme, in which any signcrypter can signcrypt a message and distribute it to a designated group, and any member in the receiving group can decrypt and verify the message using his unique decryption key with the others. Until now nobody has proposed a certificateless group signcryption scheme.
Electronic payment is one of the key issues of ecommerce development and many schemes have been proposed, [7, 8] , but as far as the use of cerficateless signcryption is concerned, to strengthen electronic payment security, there is still a lot of potential to be exploited. First, Chaum suggested the first electronic cash system in 1982. Subsequently, numerous untraceable electronic cash protocols were proposed based on these constructs (Chaum 1983 , Fan and Lei 1998 , Ferguson 1994 , Pointcheval and Stern 1997 , Camenisch et al. 1995 , Pointchval and Stern 1996 [7] . No work has been done which implements the certificateless signcryption concept in the E-cash system. In this paper the technique of certificateless group signcryption is used to guarantee the privacy of users.
In this paper, we combined the features of a certificateless signature scheme with a group signcryption scheme. In the proposed scheme, a signcrypter of a group signcrypts a message on behalf of the group with the help of the group manager. The scheme is secure such that neither the group manager nor any other member of the group can produce a valid signcrypted text. We also designed a secure offline electronic cash system based upon the proposed scheme. The proposed scheme is based upon the certificateless signature scheme of an e-cash system. Here the technique of certificateless group signcryption is used to guarantee the privacy of users.
The outline of this paper is as follows. The proposed scheme is described in Section 2. Section 3, discusses the security analysis of the proposed scheme. In Section 4, we presented the offline electronic cash system. Security analysis of the proposed electronic cash scheme is discussed in Section 5. We finally conclude in Section 6.
The proposed scheme
The proposed scheme consists of a group of signcrypters (SG : U1 · · · UN), in which anyone can signcrypt a message with the group manager on behalf of the group and a key generation centre (KGC). The system model of the proposed scheme is shown in Fig. 1 . The proposed scheme consists of six phases, which are described below.
Setup.
The KGC chooses a integer n as the product of two large primes p and q such that p = 2p
are all large primes using the safe prime scheme [8] . Then he chooses g as a generator of GF (p). Then he submits n and g to the group manager (GM).
Partial private key generation.
This algorithm is run by KGC. In this phase the KGC chooses a master secret key M sk as his private parameter and his identity, ID KGC . Then he computes a public parameter M pk whose security lies in solving the discrete logarithmic problem.
Then he sends (M pk , ID KGC ) to the group manager GM. 
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Private key generation.
The steps of private key generation are as follows: First the group manager chooses three private parameters, V and ID GM and computes the private key and public key of the group as follows
Then the group manager makes (n, g, M pk , ID GM , e, G pbk ) public and keeps secret (d, v, G prk ) as his private key. The model of this phase is described in Fig. 2 .
User key generation.
This phase is in between the group manager and the signcrypter. The steps of this phase are as follows.
Step 1.
After finding the public parameter, any signcrypter on behalf of the group chooses a private parameter W ∈ Z * n and computes ID U
Then he sends ID U to the GM, in a private channel.
Step 2.
After finding the value of ID U , the group manager chooses a private parameter α ∈ Z * n and computes δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 as
After computing all the values the group manager sends (δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 ) to the signcrypter.
Step 3. Then the signcrypter checks the authenticity of the parameter by using the equation.
If this equation holds, then the user accepts three parameters, otherwise he will resend it again to the group manager. The layout of this phase is shown in Fig. 3 .
Correctness. 
Signcryption.
In this phase the user signcrypt the document on behalf of the group. First the user chooses a private parameter β ∈ Z * n , then computes µ, Key(K ) and a cipher (σ ) as follows
Then the user sends the signcrypted text (µ, σ , Ω, Ω 1 , Ω 2 ) to the verifier.
Verification.
After finding the signcrypted text, the verifier tries to check the authenticity of the signcrypted text, for this he has to find the message first. So in order to find a message the verifier computes the following steps such as
otherwise he will reject the message as an invalid message. After finding M ′ , the verifier checks the authenticity of the message as
If this condition holds then the verifier accepts the signcrypted text on the message. The layout of the model of signcryption and verification is described in Fig. 4 .
Opening.
In case of any legal dispute the group manager can identify the sender by
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Security analysis
In this section we will provide a formal security model for the proposed scheme. So we must always take two types of adversaries into consideration: The security analysis of the proposed scheme is described below.
Theorem 1. The signcrypted text generated by the proposed scheme is indeed a valid one.
Proof. This theorem shows that the correctness property of the proposed scheme holds.
As derived from Eq. (16), we know that
Therefore the implementation of our proposed scheme is correct. 
Thus, the traceability property of the proposed scheme is satisfied.
Theorem 3. The proposed scheme can withstand both Type-I and Type-II attack, under the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, as defined below.
Definition 1 (Type I Attack). An adversary A 1 having access to the system cannot have access to the master secret key. However, A 1 may replace public keys, extract partial private and private keys and can make a signcrypted text.
Proof. In Type-I attack the game is played between the adversary (A 1 ) and the challenger (C). The interaction between them consists of the following phases as described below.
Partial private key generation.
In this phase the challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate a master secret key of KGC and a public parameter (M pk ) corresponding to the id of key generation centers (KGC), then the challenger (C) sends (M pk ) to the adversary (A 1 ) when he asks for it.
Key generation
In the key generation phase, the challenger (C ) first computes a secret value (V ) corresponding to the identity of group manager (ID GM ), then with the help of the secret key and partial private key, the challenger computes the private key of the group manager (G prk ), then he send it to the adversary.
Request public key.
Now the adversary can request the public key for any identity. Upon receiving the request, the challenger calculates the value of the public key of the group manager (G pbk ), and sends it to the adversary.
Replace public key.
After receiving the public key from the challenger, the adversary takes a new secret value V 1 and replaces the public key taken from the challenger with his own public key G pbk1 .
Signcryption.
For signcrypt, a message from the challenger needs some secret value chosen by the user, the public key of the group manager and the original document. Then the challenger submits the signcrypted text S = (µ, σ , Ω, Ω 1 , Ω 2 ) on message M 1 corresponding to a public key for an identity of the sender to the adversary corresponding to the public key of the group manager. The attacker wins the game if the designcrypt queries mean Designcrypt (M pk1 , ID GM1 , V 1 , M 1 , S 1 ) is equal to 1, but it is not possible for the adversary to break the security as the adversary cannot query the private key for an ID GM1 , also the adversary is not able to query the signcryption on message M 1 .
Definition 2 (Type II Attack).
In a Type-II attack, adversary (A 2 ) has access to the master-key, but cannot replace any user's public key. ) - Proof. The game is played between the adversaries (A 2 and the challenger (C)).
Partial private key generation.
In this phase the challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate a master secret key of KGC and a public parameter (M pk ) corresponding to the Id of key generation Centers (KGC), then the challenger (C) sends the private key and the public key to the adversary. After getting this the adversary can compute the partial private key.
Key generation
Then, the challenger (C ) first computes a secret value (V ) corresponding to the identity of group manager (ID GM ), then with the help of the secret key and partial private key, the challenger computes the private key of the group manager (G prk ), then he sends it to the adversary A 2 .
Request public key.
Then the challenger computes the corresponding public key of the group manager and gives it upon the adversary's request.
Signcryption.
Now the challenger can compute a signcrypted text S 1 = (µ, σ , Ω, Ω 1 , Ω 2 ) on message M 1 corresponding to a public key for an identity of the sender and the public key of the group manager and send it to the adversary A 2 . The attacker wins the game if the designcrypt queries mean Designcrypt (M pk1 , ID GM1 , V 1 , M 1 , S 1 ) is equal to 1, but it is not possible for the adversary to break the security as the adversary cannot query the private key for an IDGM1, also the adversary is not able to query the signcryption on message M 1 . So it is proved that the proposed scheme is secure against the Type-I and Type-II attack.
Theorem 4. The proposed certificateless group signcryption scheme satisfies the unlink ability property.
Proof. After obtaining the group signcrypted text (µ, σ , Ω, Ω 1 , Ω 2 ) for message M, the verifier verifies the signcrypted text by using the group's public data G pbk and ID GM as shown in the Eq. (18). Again if the verifier gets another signcrypted text (µ
There are no identical parameters in the two signcrypted texts (µ, σ , Ω, Ω 1 , Ω 2 ). So when the verifier wants to know the identity of the signcrypter, he must consult the group manager. Moreover, the proposed scheme has five parameters, namely (α, β, µ, e, W ) to hide the true value of the group signcrypted text. So it is hard to reveal the values of (α, β, µ) from the signcrypted text. Thats why it is impossible for an adversary to link a signcrypted text to the corresponding signcrypter.
The proposed offline electronic cash system
An electronic cash system is composed of a set of protocols in which four participants are involved: a customer, a group manager of that customer group (GM), a merchant and a bank. Basically, six distinct phases are included in an electronic cash system: (i) initialization phase (ii) joining phase (iii) withdrawal phase (iv) payment phase (v) deposit phase (vi) identity Revocation phase. The layout of the proposed E-cash scheme is given in Fig. 5 .
Initialisation.
As our proposed scheme is a certificateless scheme, this phase is done by a trusted third party Key Generation Center (KGC), and the Group manager of the customer group. The group manager of the group creates a private and public key of that group with KGC.
are all large primes using safe prime scheme. Then he chooses g as a generator of GF (p). Then he submits n and g to the group manager (GM).
The KGC randomly chooses two private parameters M 
Then he sends (n, g, M ′ pk ) to the GM in a private channel. Step 3.
After finding the parameter from the KGC, the GM first chooses a private parameter V ′ ∈ Z * n and the identity of his own as ID ′ GM and computes the group's private and public key as G
Then the GM makes this parameter (n, g, ID 
Joining.
In this phase each customer C i wants to join the customer group, interacting with the group manager as Step 1. First each customer C i chooses a random private parameter W ′ ∈ Z * n and computes the following as
And sends to the GM. After finding the identity of the customer, GM creates a membership certificate for each customer as
After that the GM creates a new entry with the membership certificate as (M c i , d) for the identification of a customer. The joining phase is described in Fig. 7 .
Withdrawal.
The customer contacts the bank, asking for a coin. The bank requires proof of identity from the customer, so for this the customer completes the commitment phase for signcrypting the process.
In this step each customer randomly chooses two private parameters α ′ , β ′ ∈ Z * n and computes the signcrypted text as
where T is the concatenation of date and time. 
Step 2. After finding the signcrypted text from the customer, the bank checks the validity of the text as
The detail phase is described in Fig. 8 .
Correctness.
(
T * δ 31 mod n.
If this equation satisfies, then the bank computes
Then the bank sends these two parameters (Ω ′ , Ω ′ 1 ) to the customer as his identification for the bank.
Step 3.
After finding the secret parameter from the bank, the customer calculates another secret parameter as
and stores the coin as (Ω
This phase is the interaction between the customer and the merchant.
Step 1. For payment the customer sends the coin (Ω
to the merchant, after finding the coin the merchant first checks the validity of the coin, for this he has to compute
Then he checks whether the value of the condition is satisfied or not
if yes the merchant goes to the next step, otherwise it is resent to the customer.
and sends the value of F to the customer.
Step 2. After finding this the customer calculates a new parameter as
and sends the value of F ′ to the merchant. Then the merchant accept the coin ifvF
The framework of the phase is described in Fig. 9 .
Deposit.
The phase is the interaction between the merchant and the bank.
Step 1. After accepting the coin, the merchant sends this signcrypted text (Ω
and the coin (F , F ′ ) to the bank.
If the coin exists, it gives a invalid message, otherwise the bank checks whether h(µ
If it is valid, the bank stores the coin (F , F ′ ) in the deposited table. The layout of the phase is described in Fig. 10 .
Identity revocation.
In case of any dispute, the bank sends the signcrypted text to the GM, then the GM can identify the cheating customer as
Security analysis
In this section we discuss some aspects of the security and efficiency of our electronic cash system. We prove that our off-line electronic payment system is secure against attacks such as unforgeability and anonymity.
Unforgeability.
In the proposed scheme a dishonest customer cannot forge the coin as in case of any blackmailing or any legal dispute, the bank gives a notice to the group manager of that customer group about the dispute. Then the group manager can find the identification of the customer by using the Eq. ID c i = Ω ′ /Ω ′ 1 G ′ prk mod n and nobody can withdraw an e-coin except the user who is the account owner in the withdraw protocol.
Anonymity.
The proposed scheme gives the facility to the user, as he/she can make an anonymous payment with the merchant as the merchant cannot know the identification of a customer. He can only receive a coin from the user and verify the validity of
